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W
estern historiography has long neglected the importance of the Versailles Treaty 
for Asia. When there was an expression of interest, it was often exclusively focused 
on the consequences for China, including the issue of the 21 Demands made by 
Tokyo to the Chinese authorities of the time and the emergence of an anti-Japanese 
nationalism with the May 4th Movement in 1919.
In Asia itself, the focus was at the time also very much on the disillusions, both in China 
and in Korea, but also in Japan, that followed the settlement of the Versailles Treaty and the 
establishment of the League of Nations. 
However, the Versailles Treaty signed on June 28, 1919 also played a signicant role in the 
constitution of a new international order, based on liberal values, and the establishment of an 
international organization to solve international relations issues, in which Japan had initially 
fully participated. It was also the rst time that, in a departure from the traditionally exclusively 
Eurocentric posture of the Great powers, Asian powers became full actors of the global 
international system.
Different perceptions of the Versailles Treaty in Europe and in Japan
One hundred years after that event, the interest expressed in Japan for the Versailles Treaty, 
however, has been growing and is particularly significant in a contemporary context where 
the international liberal order is under threat. For Japanese analysts today, the participation of 
Japan in the Paris Peace Conference constitutes the rst manifestation of Tokyo’s engagement 
alongside the powers that defend multilateralism and a liberal international order threatened by 
the temptation of some states to use coercion to change the status quo as well as by the rise of 
populism and temptations of isolationism in Western democracies.
Abstract
The First world war and its sequels had long term consequences at the global level, 
including in Asia and its perception in the world. The Versailles Treaty established the 
premices of a value-based liberal international system. For the rst time, a non-European 
nation, Japan, fully participated and played a major diplomatic role in the debates and 
negotiations of the peace conference. However, the Western centric dimension of the Paris 
Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty as well as the opposition of the United States 
to racial equality clause also resulted in frustrations and future strategic instability related 
to the refusal of Western nations to fully integrate Japan, one of the allies, as an equal and 
legitimate power in the new concert of nations. 
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However, one cannot but note the differences in the assessments of the consequences of the 
Treaty in Europe and Asia. In Europe, among politicians as well as historians, the analysis of the 
consequences of the Versailles Treaty is more negative.1 For most of these analysts, the Versailles 
Treaty bore the germ of the Second World War. The will to “punish” Germany as the only 
responsible actor for the war, the nancial demands, followed by French occupation of the Ruhr 
in 1923 contributed to the emergence of Nazism and the rise of Hitler. The League of Nations 
is often criticized by some for its intrinsic weaknesses, while, for others, it is the “idealism” that 
presided over the Paris Peace Conference, and particularly the issue of “punishing” the defeated 
nations as “culprits” of the war that led to lingering enmities and tensions. 
In Japan, the only non-Western power among the signatories, however, the rediscovery of the 
Versailles Treaty and the signicant role played by Japanese diplomats at the time, is an essential 
element of contemporary historiography. It shows that, as early as the 1920s, Japan could assert 
itself as a legitimate actor of the post-First World War concert of nations.
However, the deficit of understanding of the international role of Japan under the Taisho 
Democracy (1912–1926), including its role as one of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty and 
its participation―contrary to the United States who never ratied the Treaty―in the League of 
Nations, still dominates European historiography. This lack of knowledge weighs not only on past 
appreciations but also on the understanding of contemporary issues and possible cooperation 
between Europe and Japan. It results from an analysis of the building process of the international 
system after the First World War that remained almost exclusively Western-centric.
The importance of the Versailles Treaty for Japan and the ambiguity of Western 
powers
Japan was a critical player at the Paris Peace Conference, after taking control, as a legitimate 
actor alongside the Allies, of Germany’s concessions in the Shandong Peninsula in China and the 
Pacic Islands that were part of the German Empire in the Pacic.
Concerning Asia, the Versailles Treaty is often considered through its most damaging 
consequences that led to growing tensions with China. However, that approach is an anachronism 
and Japan’s position at the time, differed little from that of the other great powers, whose primary 
objective was also in preserving their own interests in Asia, and especially in China. 
The United States, in particular, initially fully supported Japanese claims on the Shandong 
Peninsula, as well as the mandate given to Tokyo on the Pacific Islands under the control of 
the League of Nations. Nonetheless, when Japanese demands on Shandong were subsequently 
rejected, it was mainly because they contravened the interests of other Western powers present 
in China, worried by the emergence of a new competitor in the region.
Despite these limitations, the Versailles Treaty marked for the first time the entry of an 
Asian actor in the diplomatic concert hitherto monopolized by the European powers. Japan’s 
participation in the Paris Peace Conference constituted a paradigm shift with the rst steps of a 
globalization process that still expands to our days.
However, from the very beginning, this globalization, which was based on the concept of 
universal values, was tainted with limits that became the source of future frustrations.
The first and most important of these limits was the refusal by some Western powers, and 
more specically by the United States in spite of the principles defended by President Wilson, 
to accept the amendment of article 21 of the constitution of the League of Nations imposing 
the principle of racial equality proposed by Japan and supported by China. The rejection of the 
amendment, defended by France, was particularly damaging as it had received a majority of 
1  Georges-Henri Soutou, La grande illusion, quand la France perdait la paix, 1914-1920, Paris, Tallandier, 
2015.
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votes.
Similarly, while in Europe, the Washington Conference of 1923 is still perceived as the rst 
step towards arms control mechanisms, for Japan it translated into the will of the United States 
and Britain to deny the legitimacy of Japanese positions and to contain the development of Tokyo 
naval capacities.2
In both cases, it was the very principle of common values and equal rights that had been 
encouraged and at the same time ignored by Western powers. However, despite these initial 
failures, the question of common values remains critical for the international community despite 
the evolutions of great power relationships and political systems since the Second World War and 
the end of the Cold War.
The contemporary relevance of the issues raised at the Paris Peace Conference
In Asia today, the challenge of ideological bi-polarization, amplified by the increased overall 
power of the People’s Republic of China, remains an essential part of the strategic calculus of 
democracies. On one side there is a qualied system of liberal democracies, attached to a set of 
principles based on the attachment to the universality of specic values, the rules of international 
law and the rejection of the use of force to change the status quo; on the other side authoritarian 
systems reject these principles of universality and common values. In that context, it is worth 
remembering that, contrary to the expectations raised by the theories of the end of history 30 
years ago, these fundamental issues―and these constraints―are still relevant and cannot be 
ignored in Europe, despite the geographical distance that separates the two continents.
Moreover, the lessons of the Versailles Treaty are also pertinent when addressing the issues 
of appeasement and pacism. The First World War, its destructions and its industrial-size number 
of victims opened the way to pacism and the temptation of appeasement at any cost. This also 
led to the Munich Conference, the annexation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia by the 
Third Reich and the emergence of an uncontrollable German power, animated by a desire for 
revenge and ready to destroy the post-First World War status quo. In Asia today, the situation is 
less dramatic than in 1938. However, the fear of being involved in any conict and the temptation 
of disengagement or appeasement could also lead to more severe tensions resulting from 
miscalculations on the part of certain powers, also driven by a revanchist posture and a desire for 
“reparation.”
To answer these threats, taking into account the ideological dimension of the shared values 
that underlie the liberal world order, we witness the emergence of new concepts. These concepts 
must be inclusive and open to all States and entities that support these universal values.
The need for a value-based order and new concepts
This is the case with the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which establishes a bridge 
between Asia and Europe, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and is also an answer to 
the more grandiose projects of the Belt and Road Initiative whose objective―beyond economic 
interests―is to be used as an instrument of China’s great power policy in its region and beyond. 
There again, history, with references to the Chinese traditional tributary system, as well as 
contemporary international strategy, is at the almost exclusive service of a policy whose rst and 
most important goal is to preserve a regime in needs of legitimacy.
However, this “free and open Indo-Pacic” concept also poses several challenges, that are also 
opportunities for cooperation. The rst of these challenges is that of inclusiveness. 
The inclusion of Europe―despite its limitations―is necessary, not only because this it is 
in Europe that the universal values that establish the liberal order emerged, but also because 
2  Pierre Grosser, L’histoire du monde se fait en Asie, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2017.
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Europe possesses, by itself and through some of its States, capabilities that go far beyond “soft 
power.”
The inclusion of all States bordering the Indian Ocean, from South East Asia to South Asia 
and the shores of Africa, is also a necessity. These territories, particularly in Africa, open new 
prospects for external powers looking for economic opportunities, easy access to resources but 
also a source of support for the ideological battles fought in international institutions for the 
control of globalization and the imposition of a set of new norms challenging the liberal order.
However, for a country like Japan―in cooperation with other partners―these challenges are 
also an opportunity. It is the opportunity to play a more signicant and more active role, on the 
basis of common values, in favor of a more balanced model of development. This is what would 
constitute the rst element of long-term stability, especially in Africa.
This opportunity also supposes a capacity for opening up, including opening up to new 
partnerships, as is already the case with countries like France. Japan has a strategic partnership 
with France, based on the sharing of common values and fueled by a yearly 2 + 2 dialogue 
between foreign and defense ministers of both countries. Beyond France and the United 
Kingdom, in 2018, the European Union and Japan have also signed a strategic partnership, 
alongside a free trade agreement, which also expands Tokyo’s margin of manoeuver.
This, of course, does not question the preeminence and the essential role played by the 
United States, Japan’s most important security partner since the 1950s. However, as at the time of 
the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, the United States seems to be again tempted by 
isolationism and an “America First” posture. This posture can be particularly uncomfortable for 
its allies, even if we can be condent that this would not withstand a direct and immediate threat 
to the United States interests or those of their allies, particularly in Asia.
The principle of “openness” also applies to Japan, with all the risks of uneasiness it can 
involve. It is precisely the strength of democracies, on the domestic as well as on the international 
scene, to be able to accept and feed on the debates they may involve. It is at this price that real 
partnerships, based on mutual understanding, can be put in place. In the case of Japan, these 
partnerships can also be based on the fact that Tokyo remains the only power in Asia to have 
followed, from the end of the nineteenth century to the present day, a path very similar to that of 
its European partners.
